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INTRODUCTION

The growing debate on genetic research and engineering is complemented by the
equally passionate dispute on whether DNA sequences should be protected by
patents. In 1990, the United States embarked on a thirteen-year venture called the
Human Genome Project ("HGP"), the purpose of which was to identify all the genes
in the human genome,1 determine the sequence of base pairs for the entire human
genome, and "store [that] information in databases" for further advancements in
biotechnology. 2 This project significantly impacts life-sciences research, as the
potential for commercialization of DNA-based technologies is projected to exceed $45
billion by 2009.3 This projection has prompted both public and private entities to
pursue patent protection of isolated DNA sequences in hopes of someday capitalizing
on the new technology. 4 As a result, millions of gene and genome-related patent
5
applications have been filed in the United States.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") initially rejected patent
applications for DNA sequences on the premise that the claimed inventions lacked
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1 Genelabs Techs., Inc., Glossary of Terms, http://www.genelabs.com/resources/glossary.html

(last visited Feb. 28, 2006). The genome is the "complete set of genetic information of an organism."
Id.
2 Human Genome Project Information, About the Human Genome Project Research,
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/project/about.shtml
(last visited Sept. 26,
2005).
3 Human
Genome Project Information, Potential Benefits of Human Genome Project,
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/project/benefits.shtml (citation omitted) (last
visited Sept. 26, 2005).
4 See G. Kenneth Smith & Denise M. Kettleberger, Patents and the Human Genome Project,
22 AIPLA Q.J. 27, 48 (1994). In response to internal publication pressures and to encourage rapid
development of products for the treatment of disease, the National Institutes of Health ("NIH")
initially applied for patent protection of 351 partial cDNA fragments in June of 1991. Id. at 46.
Although most condemned this practice, in response, patent applications began to surface from
throughout the world. Id. at 48. The NIH, after receiving a wall of rejections from the PTO, decided
to discontinue the pursuit of the patents, hoping to put an end to the international rush to patent
DNA fragment sequences with no known function. See id. at 50. This action came too late. Id.
Human
Genome
Project
Info.,
Genetics
and
Patenting,
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/elsi/patents.shtml#2
(last visited Oct. 28,
2005).
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utility. 6 However, these rejections did not prevent many HGP participants to rush to
file as many DNA sequence patent applications as possible.' The first true gene
patent on a cDNA8 gene sequence, encoding the endorphin gene of the mouse
genome, was issued in 1982. 9 However, many researchers assert that the first
therapeutically important DNA patent was issued in 1985,10 concerning a
recombinant DNA molecule useful in producing proteins.11 One way the PTO has
attempted to restrict the number of DNA sequence patents it grants every year is by
expanding the utility requirement. 12 As the PTO and the courts struggle to strike a
balance between protecting innovation and ensuring access to technology, 13 there
remains much speculation as to how DNA sequence patents will ultimately affect this
balance.
This comment addresses the history of the utility requirement and how an
attempt by the PTO to provide guidance in analyzing DNA sequence patent
6 Leslie Roberts, Gene Patents:Rumors Fly over Rejection of NIH Claim, 257 Sci. 1855, 1855
(1992) (noting the August 20, 1992 initial rejection of NIH's DNA sequence patent application by the
PTO for lack of utility). The PTO stated that:
it would be necessary for one to do further work in order to establish utility for
many of the nucleotides embraced by the claims. The instant application does not
teach one of skill in the art the significance of any putative result of any of the
tests or processes alluded to in the application.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg and Robert Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentability of Certain
7nvuntions Associated with the Iduntiieuation of Pa'tialeDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 14-15
(1996).
7 See Christopher Anderson, NIH Drops Bid for Gene Patents, 263 SCd. 909, 909 (1994). 'NIH
was not alone in trying to patent [DNA sequences]. Several companies have said they are pursuing
similar patents, and many others are thought to be doing so privately." Id.
8 See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of cDNA.
9 Adrenocorticotropin-lipotropin Precursor Gene, U.S. Patent No. 4,322,499 (filed Dec. 22,
1978) (issued Mar. 30, 1982).
10 Recombinant DNA Molecules and Their Use in Producing Human Interferon-like
Polypeptides, U.S. Patent No. 4,530,901 (filed Feb. 4, 1980) (issued July 23, 1985).
11 See
Warren
Kaplan,
Biotech
Patenting
101,
7,
http://www.genewatch.org/programs/patents/patenting101.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). "Through the end of
December 2000, approximately 25,000 DNA-based patents were granted." Kale Franz & Peter
Faletra, DNA Dilemma: A Perspective on Current US. Patent and Trademark Office Philosophy
Concerning Life Patents, 2 U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY J. OF UNDERGRADUATE RES. 25, 25 (2002),
available at http://www.scied.science.doe.gov/scied/JUR-v2/pdfs/Franz.pdf.
12 See generally Revised Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092 (Jan. 5, 2001)
[hereinafter 2001 Guidelines] (amending 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (July 14, 1995)). In the 1995 Utility
Examination Guidelines, a two pronged inquiry for utility was established, where an asserted utility
was required to be "specific" and "credible" in order to satisfy the test. See Utility Examination
Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263, 36,264 (July 14, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Guidelines]. This analysis
was expanded on in subsequent versions of the Utility Examination Guidelines. See Revised Utility
Examination Guidelines; Request for Comments, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,440, 71,441 (Dec. 21, 1999)
[hereinafter 1999 Interim Guidelines]. In 1999, the PTO issued Interim Guidelines in response to
public comment requesting revision of the 1995 Guidelines. Id. The latest version of the Utility
Examination Guidelines was issued in 2001, re-establishing the requirement that the asserted
utility be "substantial" in addition to being "specific" and "credible." See 2001 Guidelines, at 1,098.
13 See genera]ly35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000). Access to patented work is acquired through licensing
agreements. See id., see also United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir.
1981) (stating that "[t]he right to license [a] patent, exclusively or otherwise, or to refuse to license
at all, is 'the untrammeled right' of the patentee"). However, there is no requirement that the
patent holder grant a license to whoever wishes to obtain one. See id.

[5:238 2006]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

applications has given rise to a new level of inquiry. Part I provides a basic overview
of molecular biology and the requirements for obtaining a patent. Part 11 addresses
the benefits and dangers of allowing DNA sequences to be patented. Part I1 outlines
the steps that the PTO and Congress have taken to address some of those dangers.
Part IV considers a specific example of how courts have struggled to define what the
new utility requirements entail. Part V offers suggestions for finding the appropriate
balance between promoting technological advancement in genetics and allowing
others to benefit from those advancements. Part VI concludes with a summarization
of significant points.

I.BACKGROUND
This section provides the scientific and legal fundamentals for the rest of the
comment. Parts A and B introduce the basics of molecular biology and DNA
manipulation respectively. Part C outlines the purposes of patent law. Parts
D through F describe the patentability requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and
utility respectively.

A. MolecularBiology Foundations
Deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") is contained within the cells that make up all
living things.1 4 DNA, enclosed within a cell's nucleus, encodes the "information
necessary to build the cells and tissue of an organism." 15 Four single chemical units
called nucleotides 16 are linked linearly into polymers, 17 composing DNA. The precise
arrangement of nucleotides forms the hereditary units or genes, controls an
"organism's identifiable traits," and allows for the genetic stability of that organism. 18
Every inherited trait is encoded by at least one gene. 19
The linear polymer strands of DNA form a double-helical structure. 20 The
Earthnet.net, Cells, http://www.earthnet.net/cell.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
HARVEY F. LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 8, 100 (4th ed. 2000).
16See id. at 101. Each nucleotide consists of a phosphate group linked to a five-carbon sugar
14
'5

molecule (deoxyribose) which is in turn linked to one of four organic bases: adenine, guanine,
cytosine, and thymine (abbreviated A, G, C, and T respectively). Id.
17 Id.
A polymer is a "large molecule composed of multiple identical or similar units
(monomers) linked by covalent bonds." Id. at G-14.
18 See id. at 100; see also ANTHONY J. F. GRIFFITHS ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC
ANALYSIS 2 (7th ed. 2000). A gene is a small segment of DNA that can exist in various forms, called
alleles. Id. "Allelic variation causes heredity variation within a species. At the protein level, allelic
variation becomes protein variation." Id.
19See GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 18, at 11 (discussing how one gene can affect a particular
trait).
Although allelic differences cause phenotypic differences such as pigmented and
albino, this does not mean that only one gene affects skin color. It is known that
there are several. However, the diYfe-renee between pigmented ... and albino is
caused by the difference at one gene; the state of all the other pigment genes is
irrelevant.
Id.
20 LODISH ET AL., supra note 15, at 103.

[5:238 2006]

Patentability of DNA Sequences

proposal of the DNA double-helix structure in 1953 by James Watson and Francis
21
Crick marks the beginning of modern molecular biology and biotechnology.
Studying this structure, scientists were able to understand how DNA replicates, how
22
proteins are made, and how traits are passed from one generation to the next.
The DNA double helix structure is governed by a process called
complementation. 23 The order of the nucleotide bases determines the structure of
proteins responsible for directing cell metabolism through enzyme activity. 24 DNA
not only acts as a template for DNA replication but for ribonucleic acid ("RNA") as
well. 25 Messenger RNA ("mRNA") copies the DNA template and carries the DNA's
message outside of the cell's nucleus. 26 In a process called translation, transfer RNA
("tRNA"), attached to amino acids, interprets the mRNA. 27 Amino acids are the
building blocks of proteins; this relationship is akin to that of nucleotides as the
components of DNA. 28 Each triplet code of nucleotides of tRNA has a different amino
acid attached to it.29 The amino acids30 attached to the tRNA form protein

21 LODISH ET AL., supra note 15, at 103. Watson and Crick based their double helical structure
"on the analysis of x-ray diffraction patterns coupled with careful model building." Id.
22
Public
Understanding
of
Biotechnology,
Fact
File:
DNA
Basics,

http://www.pub.ac.za/factfile/dna.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
23 See GEOFFREY M. COOPER, THE CELL: A MOLECULAR APPROACH 95-96 (2d ed. 2000). When
a strand contains all the details necessary to explicate the sequence of bases on the other strand,
this is known as complementation. Id. Within the double helical structure, each adenine base is
paired with its thymine base complement, and each guanine base is paired with its cytosine base
complement. Id. at 95. During DNA replication, the strands of the double helix unwind and each
strand acts as a template. Id. at 96. Free A, T, C, and G nucleotides within the cell pair up with
their complementary bases on the single stranded DNA, producing two identical sequences of double
stranded DNA. Id.
24 LODISH ET AL., supra note 15, at 101. Enzymes are "biological macromolecule[s] that act ...
as ... catalyst[s]." Id. at G-6.
2, Id. at 101. RNA is another polynucleotide, structurally similar to DNA. Id. The only
difference is that the five-carbon sugar in RNA is ribose instead of deoxyribose and the thymine base
is replaced with a uracil base. Id. Single stranded RNA is formed by complementary base pairing
with the DNA template in a process called transcription. Id. at 100. However, only a portion of the
DNA sequence, the genes, is actually embodied by mature RNA. See GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note
18, at 8. "In the genes of many eukaryotes, the protein-encoding sequence is interrupted by
segments (ranging in number from one to many) called introns. The origin and function of introns is
still unclear. They are excised from the primary transcript. The split-up coding sequences between
the introns are called exons." Id.
26 LODISH ET AL., supra note 15, at 100.
27 See id. at 116-17. Translation refers to the process of arranging amino acids from the base
sequence of mRNA and the joining of those amino acids to form a protein. Id.
Because 4 nucleotides . . . could represent only 4 of the 20 possible amino acids in
coding the linear arrangement in proteins, a group of nucleotides is required to
represent each amino acid ....
[T]he actual genetic code used by cells is a triplet
code, with every three nucleotides being "read" from a specified starting point in
the mRNA. Each triplet is called a codon.
Id.
28 Id. at 51.
2
) Id. at 116-17.
Transfer RNA (tRNA) is the key to deciphering the code words in mRNA. Each
type of amino acid has its own type of tRNA, which binds it and carries it to the
growing end of a [protein] chain if the next code word on the mRNA calls for it.
The correct tRNA with its attached amino acid is selected at each step because
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polymers.3 1 The overall notion of converting DNA to mRNA to protein is often
32
referred to as the central dogma of molecular biology.
Small changes in the DNA sequence, called mutations, can lead to dramatic
changes in the structure of the protein produced or in the level of protein
expression.33 Many genetic diseases, including certain cancers, arise from the
35
spontaneous mutations in germ cells 3 4 because of a change in protein expression.
These mutations can be imparted to future generations. 36 Researchers have devoted
many resources to deciphering the genetic code and understanding biochemical
pathways.

B. DNA Man'pulation
Many secrets are locked in the DNA sequence; due to the multitude of
biotechnological advances made in the previous decades, researchers are now
unlocking some of those secrets.3 7 Tools such as recombinant DNA techniques,
classical gene analysis, and gene mapping allow researchers to isolate and
characterize the genes that encode particular proteins. 38 These tools can also identify

each specific tRNA molecule contains a three-base sequence that can base-pair
with its complementary code word in the mRNA.
Id. at 116.
30 See generallyid. at 51-53 (describing the different types of amino acids, how they are linked
together, and how they determine the shape and function of a protein). The twenty amino acids
have the same general structure; the differences in the amino acid shapes, sizes, charges,
hydrophobicities, and reactivities can be attributed to the different side chain groups attached to
each amino acid. -d. at 51. Amino acids are chemically linked via peptide bonds. Id. at 53.
'31Id. at 117. The actual process of translation can be divided into three stages: initiation,
elongation, and termination. See COOPER, supra note 23, at 282. This process is facilitated by
protein complexes and specialized RNA that recognize particular tRNA and mRNA sequences,
provide the energy necessary for protein synthesis, and aid in the correct folding of protein as it is
being synthesized. Id. at 286-87, 290.
32 LODISH ET AL., supra note 15, at 101.

'33See id. at 255; see also GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 18, at 12.
The mutational site in the DNA can be of a number of types. The simplest and
most common type is nucleotide-pair substitution, which can lead to amino acid
substitution or to premature stop codons. Small deletions and duplication also
are common. Even a single base deletion or insertion produces widespread
damage at the protein level; because mRNA is read from one end "in frame" in
groups of three, a loss or gain of one nucleotide pair shifts the reading frame, and
all the amino acids translationally downstream will be incorrect.
Id.
M LODISH ET AL., supra note 15, at G-8. Germ cells are precursor cells that give rise to either
sperm or ova in animals. Id.
3 See id. at 258.
'36Id.

37 Id. at 207.
38 Id. at 208. Recombinant DNA technology refers to:
A body of techniques for cutting apart and splicing together different pieces of
DNA. When segments of foreign DNA are transferred into another cell or
organism, the substance for which they code may be produced along with
substances coded for by the native genetic material of the cell or organism. Thus,
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gene mutations that could lead to abnormal proteins. 39
Recombinant DNA technology allows for the preparation of large numbers of
identical DNA molecules, through cloning, in order to produce enough material to
study. 40 If a researcher wants to identify the DNA that encodes the proteins of a
particular cell type, he can isolate the mRNAs expressed in that cell. 4 1 Through a
process called reverse transcription, researchers can make DNA copies from
43
expressed mRNAs. 42 These copies are called complementary DNAs or cDNAs.
Researchers customarily clone cDNA through various recombinant techniques, and
compile the cDNA into libraries for later use as probes to study which genes are
expressed in certain tissues at any given time. 44 The cDNA libraries are tissuethese cells become "factories" for the production of the protein coded for by the
inserted DNA.
Cambridge Healthtech Institute: Biopharmaceutical/Genomic Glossaries Homepage, Recombinant
DNA Technology, http://www.genomicglossaries.com/content/instrument-tech.asp (last visited Sept.
26, 2005). "Classical genetics consists of techniques and methodologies" of studying genes, heredity,
and variation between organisms, predating the introduction of molecular biology. Answers.com,
Genetics, http://www.answers.com/topic/genetics (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
Gene mapping refers to "various techniques for determining the relative order on a
chromosome (genetic map), the absolute position of the genes (physical map), or the relative position
of restriction sites (restriction map)." LODISH ET AL., supra note 15, at G- 11.
'9 See generallyLODISH ET AL., supra note 15, at 235-36. Vast amounts of DNA sequence data
can be stored, organized, analyzed, and distributed using computer data banks in the rapidly
growing area of computer science called bioinformatics. d. at 235. "Newly derived sequences can be
compared with previously determined sequences to search for similarities, called homologous
sequences." Id. Often, the sequences stored in these databases can suggest functions for newly
identified genes or proteins. d. Comparative analysis across gene sequences can reveal deviations
from normal gene expression. See id.
40 See id. at 207-08.
The discovery of two types of enzymes ... permitted the now common technique of
DNA cloning. One type called restriction enzymes, cuts the DNA from any
organism at specific sequences of a few nucleotides, generating a reproducible set
of fragments. The other type, called DNA ligases, can insert DNA restriction
fragments into replicating DNA molecules producing recombinant DNA. The
recombinant DNA molecules can then be introduced into appropriate cells, most
often bacterial cells; all descendents from a single such cell, called a clone, carry
the same recombinant DNA molecule. Once a clone of cells bearing a desired
segment of DNA is isolated, unlimited quantities of this DNA can be prepared. In
addition, DNA sequences up to about 100 bases long can now be synthesized by
entirely automated procedures.
Id. at 207.
41 Id

at 219.

Each of the hundreds of different cell types found in multicellular organisms must
be generated in the right number. . . . Specialized cells often have a distinctive
morphology and express proteins devoted to the specific ... functions carried out
by a particular cell type. The extensive cell specification that occurs . .. depends
on both quantitative and qualitative differences in gene expression, controlled
largely at the level of transcription.
Id. at 543. Different cell types produce different mRNAs, depending on the kinds of protein that
need to be produced to carry out the particular cell function. See id.
42 Id. at 219.
Reverse transcription uses an enzyme, reverse transcriptase, found in
'retroviruses that catalyze the synthesis of a double-stranded DNA from a single-stranded RNA
template." Id. at G-15.
43 Id. at 219.

44 COOPER, supra note 23, at 122.
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specific, and hopefully such knowledge will allow scientists to regulate gene
45
expression, as well as control protein synthesis.
An expressed sequence tag ("EST") is a short cDNA sequence that represents
part of a gene and can be used as a marker for DNA sequences. 46 ESTs are valuable
in that they enable the "identification of new genes related to a cloned gene of
interest."47 ESTs, however, do not provide much insight as to the function of the gene
48
or the protein it encodes.

C. DNA Sequences-PatentableSubject Matter?
The primary purposes of patent law are to reward invention, encourage

disclosure of inventions thus stimulating further advancements, and protect ideas in
the public domain. 49 The authority for conferring patent protection comes from the
United States Constitution, granting Congress the exclusive power "to promote the
Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the
exclusive Right to their ...
Discoveries." 50 Congress, in exercising that power by

passing the Patent Act, outlined the requirements for obtaining patent protection
and described the patentee's rights that ensue from the satisfaction of those
51
requirements.
A patent grants "the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for
sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention
in the United States" to the patent-holder for a period of 20 years from the
application filing date. 52 Patentable subject matter includes "any ... process,
45' LODISH ETAL., supra note 15, at 219.

46 COOPER, supra note 23, at 171. The term, expressed sequence tag is descriptive in that it
refers to a relatively short portion of genomic DNA sequence that is expressed in the form of mRNA.
See LODISH ETAL., supra note 15, at 227. Bioinformatic "databases of partial cDNA sequences (EST
databases) are particularly useful in designing probes for screening libraries." Id. at 235.
47 COOPER, supra note 23, at 171. This is done is by introducing a radioactive EST probe into a
DNA sample. Id. at 117. The probe will hybridize (bond) to its target complementary base sequence
in the DNA sample, showing that the gene corresponding to the EST probe was being expressed at
the time of mRNA extraction by virtue of its radioactivity. Id.
48 Cherylyn A. P. Esoy, Comment, The PTO's 2001 Revised Utility Examination Guidelinesfor
Gene PatentApplieations:Has the PTO Exceeded the Scope ofAuthority Delineatedby the Court's
Interp-retationofa "Useful"Invention 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 127, 135 (2002).
4) Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
o0 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see also Butterworth v. United States, 112 U.S. 50, 59 (1884).
In Butterworth, the court articulated:
[t]he legislation based on this provision regards the right of property in the
inventor as the medium of the public advantage derived from his invention; so
that in every grant of the limited monopoly two interests are involved, that of the
public, who are the grantors, and that of the patentee. There are thus two parties
to every application for a patent, and more, when, as in case of interfering claims
or patents, other private interests compete for preference.
Id.
51 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 154 (2000).
52 35 U.S.C. § 154; see Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944). "The
grant of a patent ... [creates] a right to be free from competition in the practice of the invention."
Id. "These laws perhaps regard the reward to the owner as a secondary consideration, but they were
intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights in order to afford greater encouragement to
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machine, manufacture, composition of matter or any new and useful improvement
thereof' provided that it satisfies the statutory requirements of utility, novelty, and
53
nonobviousness.
The first query is whether the invention claimed falls in one of the four statutory
classes that Congress intended to be patentable, as described in section 101 of the
Patent Act. 54 Historically, this requirement has been broadly interpreted. 55 In the
landmark case Diamond v. Chakrabarty,the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment
which allowed the patent applicant's claims for a human-made, genetically
56
engineered bacterium capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil.
The Chakrabartydecision centered on the facts that the bacterium had "markedly
different characteristics from any found in nature" and the discovery was
Chakrabarty's handiwork, not that of nature. 57 This decision opened the door for
patents grounded in genetic technology. 58 Perhaps, by the same reasoning as that in
Chakrabarty,DNA sequences, by no means found isolated in nature, will fall within
59
the scope of patentable subject matter.
the production of works of benefit to the public." Zacchini v Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S.
562, 577 (1977).
53 §§ 101-103.
54 § 101.
As previously discussed, the four statutory classes are any process,

machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter. See id.; see also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 964 (C.C.P.A.
1979), overruled by Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (stating that the first query in
determining patentability is whether "the inventions claimed [are] of a kind contemplated by
Congress as possibly patentable if they turn out to be new, useful, and unobvious within the
meaning of those terms as used in the statute").
55 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). This first hurdle of patentability
has proved not to be difficult to overcome because the Supreme Court has interpreted these four
classes to "include anything under the sun that is made by man." Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979,
at 5 (1952)). Thus, manifestations of nature, falling outside the scope of this definition, are not
patentable. Id.at 309; see also J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124,
138 (2001) (explaining Chakrabartyand noting that the court rejected the argument that Congress
must expressly authorize protection of new patentable subject matter); see also Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (stating that "[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth;
an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an
exclusive right"); Mitchell v. Tilghman, 86 U.S. 287, 391 (1874), ovcrruled in part by Tilghman v.
Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1881) (noting that "a mere function, principle, or result ... is obviously
forbidden by the patent law, as it would close the door to all subsequent improvements").
56 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305. The bacterium was of the genus Pseudomonas and was
alleged to contain at least two stable energy-generating plasmids (circular DNA) that provide
separate hydrocarbon degradative pathways. Id. This characteristic was not found in naturally
occurring bacteria and was claimed to provide "more efficient and rapid oil-spill control." Id.
57 Compare id. at 310 (rejecting the argument that a micro-organism was not patentable
because it was analogous to a natural, physical phenomenon), with Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (noting that "manifestations of... nature, [are] free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none").
58 See Reid G. Adler, BiotechnologyAs an IntellectualProperty,224 Sci. 357, 359 (noting that
the position of the PTO to denote animals as unpatentable subject matter was maintained even after
Chakrabarty however, eukaryotes expressing recombinant DNA or novel genes should be
considered patentable subject matter under the rationale of Chakrabarty).
59See Daniel R. Kimbell, PatentingGenes:Risks and Rewards vs. Polities and Polieies (2001),
http://cph.com/sub/index.jsp?contentid=mSY5GufMhoc9GDwgKn8skt6k
(noting that '[a]lthough
proteins, genes, and other compounds found in the body are not patentable in their naturally
occurring form, purified, isolated proteins, genes, and gene fragments may be patentable if they
meet the legal requirements for patentability").
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D. Novelty
At the time of creation or discovery, an invention must be novel in order to be
patentable; the purpose of this requirement is to keep that which is already in the
public domain in the public domain.60 By definition, an invention that is anticipated
by the prior art 61 is not novel. 62 "[T]o be patentable, [an invention] must go a
63
substantial step beyond the prior art."

E. Nonobviousness
35 U.S.C. § 103 codified the requirement "that a mere improvement over prior
art which involves nothing more than what would have been obvious to a person
skilled in art" cannot be patented. 64 The question of obviousness requires a four part
factual inquiry: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary
skill in the art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art;
and (4) secondary considerations of obviousness, including commercial success, longfelt but unresolved need, failure of others, copying, and unexpected results "to give

60 See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.01 (2004).

The novelty requirement is

codified under Title 35, section 102 of the United States code. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000); see Nickola v.
Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 909 (6th Cir. 1968) (stating that '[a] device lacks novelty if there is, or has
been, a substantially identical prior device").
61 Mohasco Indus., Inc. v. E. T. Barwick Mills, Inc. 221 F.Supp. 191, 195 (N.D. Ga.
1963).
Generally, all patents, publications and public uses which have been in existence
prior to a patentee's date of invention of [sic] more than a year prior to his filing
date are referred to as 'prior art.' If a patentee's alleged invention is identically
disclosed in the prior art, it clearly is not new. In such a situation, the alleged
invention is said to lack novelty and the patent must be declared to be invalid.
Id.
62 See CHISUM, supra note 60, § 3.01. See generallyAdvanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State
Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (expressing that an anticipation "requires that the four
corners of a single, prior art document describe every element of the claimed invention either
expressly or inherently, such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice the invention
without undue experimentation").
63 Dorr Co. v. Yabucoa Sugar Co., 119 F.2d 521, 528 (1st Cir. 1941); see also King-Seeley
Thermos Co. v. Refrigerated Dispensers, Inc., 354 F.2d 533, 537 (10th Cir. 1965). "An invention or
discovery is new or possesses the requisite element of novelty if it involves the presence of some
element, or the new position of an old element in combination, different from anything found in any
prior structure." Id.; see also Knight-Morley v. Ajax Mfg. Corp., 84 F. Supp. 215, 219 (D. Mich.
1948). ("[E]very improvement is not patentable. The improvement must be some substantial
discovery or invention, which adds to our knowledge and makes a step in advance in the useful
arts.").
(3435 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). A patent is invalid:
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains.
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the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented." 65

F. Utility Requirements
A claimed invention must be "useful" to be patentable. 66 This means that the
invention must be operative or in accordance with its intended purpose; that the
human purpose served must not be "illegal, immoral, or contrary to public policy;"
and it must confer some public benefit. 67 While this utility requirement typically
poses little hindrance to electrical or mechanical patent applications, the burden for
proving utility is inherently higher for biological and chemical inventions 68 because
69
there is "no reliable way of predicting utility based upon chemical formulas alone."
The test for determining utility is ever evolving. In Lowell v. Lewis, the court
broadly interpreted the needed utility requirement and required nothing more than a
showing that the invention was not "frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good
policy or sound morals of society." 70 However, the Supreme Court in Brenner v.
Manson rejected this de minim us standard in concluding that a chemical compound
that only had utility as a potential object for use-testing7 l did not satisfy the utility
requirement.7 2 Instead, the Brenner Court set out a new standard that required an
6 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). The court in Graham held a patent
consisting of a combination of old mechanical elements invalid where the only difference between it
and the prior art would have been obvious to a person reasonably skilled in the art. Id. at 25.
66 See id. at 9. "Only inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowledge, and were
new and useful, justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly." Id.
67 CHISUM, supra note 60, § 4.01; see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp.
1278, 1325 (D. Del. 1987) (using a usefulness test under 35 U.S.C. § 101). Under 35 U.S.C. § 101,
whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefore. To be "useful" under 35 U.S.C.[] § 101, the invention must (1) be
operable and capable of use, i.e., it must perform a designated function; (2)
achieve some minimum human purpose; and (3) that purpose must not be illegal,
immoral or contrary to public policy. In short, the product or process must be
operable, i.e., it must be capable of being used to effect the object proposed.
Id.
(38CHISUM, supranote 60, § 4.01.
( Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, Inc., 460 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting that
'such lack of predictability of useful results from the making of even the slightest variation in the
... structure or spatial arrangement of a complex molecule ... deprives the instant claims of
obviousness and anticipation of most of their vitality").
70 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568). The court, in
resolving whether the invention in question, a pump, satisfied the utility requirement, rejected the
contention that the invention must satisfy general utility. Id. The court stated that "for the
ordinary purposes of life, [the invention] must supercede the pumps in common use." Id.
71See In -reFisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (defining use-testing as "objects upon
which scientific research could be performed with no assurance that anything useful will be
discovered in the end").
72 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) (reasoning that until an invention has
been developed and refined to the point of substantial utility, there is inadequate rationalization for
permitting an applicant to monopolize what may prove to be an extensive field). The invention at
issue, whose patentability required examination by the court, was a chemical compound whose sole
utility was its potential role as an object of use-testing. Id. at 535. The court rejected the assertion
that applying the lesser utility standard adopted by Lowell "would encourage inventors of new
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invention to have "substantial utility" in its currently available form.7 3 In so
concluding, the Court reasoned that a patent "is not a reward for the search, but
74
compensation for its successful conclusion."
In re Kirk further expanded on the "substantial utility" standard.7 5 Specifically,
the court refused to find utility in a product with only a speculative use.7 6 The court
required that proof of utility be convincing to one skilled in the art and, based on the
77
facts of the case, determined that this burden of proof was not satisfied.
Because the question of DNA sequence patentability closely revolves around the
issue of utility, this requirement will be discussed in greater detail in sections III and
IV of this comment.

II.

RISKS AND BENEFITS OF DNA SEQUENCE PATENTING

This section discusses the practical implications of granting patents in DNA
sequences. Parts A and B discuss the risks and benefits respectively.

A. Risks
Challengers of DNA sequence patenting explicate many arguments in
opposition 78 to granting patents in this area including moral disquiet, public health,

processes to publicize the event for the benefit of the entire scientific community, thus widening the
search for uses and increasing the fund of scientific knowledge." Id. at 533.
73 Id. at 534-35; see also Cross v. Jizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (following
Brenner in requiring that an invention have some practical or substantial utility in order to be
considered useful for patent purposes).
74 B3renner, 383 U.S. at 535-36 (acknowledging the fact that scientific information short of
being called "useful" needs funding in order to conduct further research and noting that something
that is not presently "useful" may become so some time in the future).
7, In -r Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 945 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (holding that, in an invention for creating
steroid compounds, simply claiming that the compounds had value as intermediates that '[could] be
used to produce some intended product of no known use" was insufficient for the purposes of
meeting the utility requirement).
76Id.at 942, 945. The court asserted that:
it was [not] the intention of the statutes to require the Patent Office, the courts, or
the public to play the sort of guessing game that might be involved if an applicant
could satisfy the requirements of the statutes by indicating the usefulness of a
claimed compound in terms of possible use so general as to be meaningless and
then, after his research or that of his competitors has definitely ascertained an
actual use for the compound, adducing evidence intended to show that a
particular specific use would have been obvious to men skilled in the particular
art to which this use relates.
Id. at 942.
77 Id. (declaring that '[i]t cannot be presumed that a steroid chemical compound is 'useful'
under § 101, or that one of skill in the art will know 'how to use' it, simply because the compound is
closely related only in a structural sense to other steroid compounds known to be useful").
78

See generallyMark A. Chavez, Gone Patenting:Do the Ends Justify the Means?,7 COMP. L.

REV. & TECH. J. 255, 260-67 (2003) (presenting an overview of arguments in opposition to gene
patenting).
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and general legal policy.79
One of the strongest arguments opposing DNA sequence patenting is the
assertion that such patenting hinders innovation rather than promoting it.80 DNA
sequence patents are often referred to as "gatekeeper patents" because DNA
manipulation lies at the heart of the cures for many human diseases; there is no
substitute for genes because there can be no improvement on the composition of DNA
itself.8 1 Patent-holders can control the use of the invention by withholding or
granting licenses, 8 2 in exchange for capital, to third parties who seek to use the
invention.83
The argument postulates that by denying licenses or by charging
exorbitant amounts of money in order to obtain a license, holders of DNA sequence
patents have the ability to deprive researchers and physicians of any use of that
4
sequence for diagnosis, treatment, or development of disease treatments.8

7)See Lori B. Andrews, Genes and Patent Poliey: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights, 3
NATURE REV. GENETICS 803, 803-05 (2002) (addressing the negative impact gene patenting would
have on research, medical treatments, and disease diagnosis).
80 Id. at 805; see also Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on Provision of
Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 7 (2003) (describing how the
results of an independent study revealed that virtually none of the U.S. laboratory representatives
who responded to the study, including those from commercial laboratories, "thought that the effect
of patents and licenses on the cost, access, and development of genetic tests have been positive" and
that they thought "gene patents hinder rather than facilitate clinical genetic testing").
The
performers of this study conducted a survey of selected directors of laboratory facilities listed on the
GeneTests.org website. Id. at 4. Participants of the survey included representatives from federal,
university, nonprofit, private hospital and corporate laboratories. Id. They were asked whether
patents or licenses had prevented or caused the laboratory to choose not to develop a clinical genetic
test. -d. Sixty-five percent of the respondents analyzed "said that their laboratories had been
contacted by a patent or license holder regarding the laboratory's potential infringement of a patent
by performance of a genetic test." Id. at 5. Twenty-five percent of respondents claimed that such
notification prevented them from continuing to perform clinical tests or services that were the
subject of infringement. Id. When asked to rate the effect of gene patenting, and clinical gene
testing in general, mean ratings revealed that the respondents believed gene patenting decreased
patient access to gene testing, decreased the ability of laboratories to develop tests and research,
and increased the costs associated with testing development and administration. Id.
81 Lorelei Perez Westin, Note and Comment, Genetic Patents."Gatekeeper to the Promised
Cures, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 271, 274-275 (2002).
82 Fed. Land Bank of Wichita v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Kiowa County, State of Kan., 368
U.S. 146, 154 (1961).
The word 'license,' means permission, or authority; and a license to do any
particular thing, is a permission or authority to do that thing; and if granted by a
person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever
it purports to authorize. It certainly transfers to him all the right which the
grantor can transfer, to do what is within the terms of the license.
Id..
83 Westin, supra note 81, at 272; see also In re Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (stating that "[n]o patent owner ... shall be ... deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having .. .refused to license or use any rights to the
patent").
84 Westin, supra note 81, at 272; see also Council for Responsible Genetics, DNA Patents
Create
Monopolies
on
Living
Organisms,
April
2000,
http://www.actionbioscience.org/genomic/crg.html
(taking the position that patenting in general
makes "products more expensive and less accessible").
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Generally, this is a recurrent practice. 85
Furthermore, there is concern that granting patents in this area will
compromise effective medical care. 86 To date, there are a number of predictive genetesting options that are available or are being developed for diseases such as TaySachs disease, 87 cystic fibrosis, 88 Huntington's disease, 89 Alzheimer's disease, 90 and
predispositions to certain cancers. 91 Patents on DNA sequences would allow patentholders to require that testing procedures be performed at their own laboratories by
their own personnel. 92 A patent-holder's ability to bar others from testing for the
presence of a specific disease gene has increased concerns over the reasonable access
93
to such tests and the quality of testing procedures.
Opponents of DNA sequence patenting also assert that the growing trend
towards the commercialization of research has led to the practice of promoting
secrecy and hindering the exchange of information amongst researchers in

85 See generally Cho et al., supra note 80, at 5, 7. There is evidence to support the proposition

that license withholding practices on patented materials exist and have the tendency to hinder
research. Id.

86 See Amanda S. Pitcher, Comment, Contrary to FirstImpression, Genes Are Patentable."
Should Thero Be Limitations?, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 284, 298 (2003). There are concerns
that once a patent issues, laboratories that once charged affordable prices for testing for a particular
gene abnormality "will find themselves embroiled in licensing fees, which they will either be
unwilling to pay, or will pay despite exorbitant costs that will have to be absorbed elsewhere." Id.
"Many patients, therefore, may be forced to pay the costs passed onto them, or seek less effective,
less reliable, or perhaps unconventional methods of treatment." Id.
87 LODISH ET AL., supra note 15, at 169. Tay-Sachs disease affects the central nervous system
and is caused by a defect in an enzyme which catalyzes the break down of certain fatty substances in
the brain and nerve cells. Id. Children affected by this inherited disease will often become
demented and blind by the age of two and will rarely survive past their third birthday. Id.
88COOPER, supra note 23, at 490. Cystic Fibrosis is "the most common lethal inherited disease
in Caucasians," and is characterized by "the production of abnormally thick sticky mucus by several
types of epithelial cells" in the lining of the respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts as well as in the
sweat glands. Id.
89 GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 18, at 45. Huntington's disease is characterized by neural
degeneration which leads to convulsions and premature death. Id. The symptoms of the disease

usually do not emerge until after an individual has had children. Id. Any carrier of the gene will
exhibit the disease. Id.
90
Alzheimer's
Disease
Education
&
Referral
Center,
http://www.alzheimers.org/generalinfo.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). Alzheimer's disease largely
affects older individuals and is a form of dementia that typically involves the part of the brain that
controls memory, thought and language. Id.
91 See Access Excellence Resource Center, Understanding Gene Testing: What Types of
Diseases
Can
Be
Predicted
with
Gene
Tests,
http://www.accessexcellence.org/AE/AEPC/NIH/gene 12.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
92 Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Dilemma. Balancing CommercialIncentives with Health Needs,
2002 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 65, 89 (2002) [hereinafter Andrews, Gene Dilemma].
Like many gene patent holders, the company holding the exclusive license on a
gene associated with Alzheimer's disease, will not let any laboratory except its
own perform the test. Doctors and labs across the country face a lawsuit if they
try to determine whether one of their patients has the genetic form of Alzheimer's,
even though testing can easily be done by anyone who knows the gene sequence
without using any product or device made by the patent holder.
Id.
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biotechnology. 94 Thus, until researchers try to acquire patent rights, publication of
research findings, may be delayed. 95 Many opponents further argue that the
commercialization of genetic research diminishes the collaborative efforts in scientific
96
research.
Another argument against the patenting of DNA sequences attacks the
statutory ability to patent the products of genetic research. 97 The assertion is that
DNA sequences are not only compositions of matter, but are also information; to
allow "the patenting of such useful information is a departure from the patent
rules."9 8 Additionally, opponents of DNA sequence patenting contend that purified
genes and isolated gene fragments are no different from naturally occurring
sequences and thus, because they exist in nature, they are statutorily barred from
patent protection. 99 As previously discussed, naturally occurring manifestations fall
outside the scope of patentable subject matter. 10 0
Finally, there are ethical concerns behind DNA sequence patenting. 10 1 DNA
sequence patenting has been attacked on religious grounds based on the notion that
genetic manipulation is the same as "playing God," and that the fruits of such work
should not be rewarded with patent control. 10 2 Many challengers also maintain the
belief that granting patent rights in genetic material is tantamount to supplying
property rights in life, which could lead to the exploitation of human beings as
commodities.10 3 Lastly, some believe allowing patents on genetic material will lead to
further injustice in the distribution of wealth in the world. 10 4 The contention is that
DNA sequence patenting denies the benefits of biotechnological ("biotech") research
94 See Cho et al., supra note 80, at 8 (maintaining that the findings of their study indicated
that "information-sharing between laboratories seemed to be inhibited" by patents and licensing).
95 Andrews, Gene Dilemma, supra note 92, at 80. Studies indicate that genetic scientists with
funding from industries were more likely to delay publishing then those without such funding. Id.
96 See Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics:Evidence from a Nat
Survey, 287 JAMA 473, 473 (2002). In a survey study involving geneticists, researchers found that
of those study participants that intentionally withheld data, over fifty-three percent reported having
done so to protect the commercial value of their results. Id.
97 Pitcher, supra note 86, at 298; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-examining the Role of
Patents in Appropriating the Value of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783, 785 (2000). The DNA
sequences identified by high-throughput sequencing look less like new chemical entities than they
do like new scientific information. Id.

98 Id.

99 See Pitcher, supra note 86, at 298.
100See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); see also supra note
57 and accompanying text.
i01 See Chavez, supranote 78, at 263.
102 Id. at 265. "Some would argue that, as human knowledge increases, the area within human
control begins to intrude upon God's territory." Id.
103 See id. at 266 (expressing the contention that by patenting genes, one is reducing life to a
commodity like any other inanimate object). Some would argue that patenting genetic material
violates the "fundamental principle of morality that human beings not be used simply as a means to
one's own ends." Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix. A
Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 440
(2002).
104 See Patricia A. Lacy, Comment, Gene Patenting:UniversalHeritage vs. Reward for Human
Effort, 77 OR. L. REV. 783, 801-02 (1998). This is often referred to as the distributive justice
argument. See id. at 801. The benefits of genetic research should be justly distributed world-wide.
See id.
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to under-developed countries to the advantage of a few industrialized nations. 10 5
However, this argument is fundamentally flawed because patenting an invention in
one country does not prevent the use of that invention in another country.

B. Benefits
Despite the opposition, many advocate the benefits of patenting DNA
sequences. 10 6 The primary argument focuses on the financial aspects of biotech
research. Scientific research is an expensive endeavor, and funding for such research
is often provided by individual investors, companies, and government grants. 10 7 Such
funding would not be available without the anticipation of financial returns from the
commercialization of the fruits of research.108
Commercialization would be
impossible if not for the temporary monopoly rights granted to inventors as a reward
for their hard work and risks taken.109
An additional argument in favor of DNA sequence patenting is that patents
encourage disclosure of information, and without patents, researchers would be
required to rely on trade secret protections. 110 If disclosure took place without

See id.

105

To implement distributive justice, less-developed countries must not be excluded
from the benefits of gene research. Gene patenting is ethically suspect if it
concentrates genome benefits in the few countries affluent enough to have
sufficient resources to secure gene patents, when all humans are entitled to share
the benefits. Under the principles of distributive justice, all Earth's citizens
should enjoy the fruits of genome research, unencumbered by intellectual
property rights.
Id. at 802.

106See Byron V. Olsen, The Biotechnology BalancingAct: Patents For Gene Fragments, and
Licensing the "UsefulArts, "7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 295, 321-22 (1997) (explaining how patent law
provides the financial incentive to engage in biotechnological research and development).
107

See Barbara Looney, Should Genes Be Patented? The Gene Patenting Con troversy: Legal,

Ethial and Pol y Foundations of ann [ntcrnationalAgreement, 26 LAW & POLY INT'L BuS.231, 242
(1994) (stating that in order to make useful progress in gene research, private sector investment
incentives, including patenting, must exist); see also Chavez, supra note 78, at 261.
Typically, capital markets raise this money and investments exist only if the
prospect of large profits looms on the horizon. Companies owning gene patents
have the potential for large profits since the patents provide exclusive rights; not
surprisingly, investors are attracted to such companies with these exclusive
rights.
Id.
108 See Looney, supra note 107, at 242. It has been argued that without patent protection and
the potential for commercial return, U.S. investors would be reluctant to invest in gene research. Id.
109 Id. One of the policies that patent law tries to promote is the encouragement of "men to
pursue ideas which may produce utility" by giving inventors the exclusive rights to profits. Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
110 John J. Doll, The Patentingof DNA, 280 Scl. 689, 690 (1998) (explaining that scientists
may be less inclined to disclose their DNA products without patent protection). Furthermore,
'[i]ssuance of patents to such products ...results in the dissemination of technological information
to the scientific community for use as a basis for further research." Id.; see also Chavez, supra note
78, at 261-62. By relying on trade secret protections, investors, instead of publicly disclosing
inventions, must conceal the inventions in order to maintain control over them. Id. at 262.
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protection, other researchers would be able to reap the benefits of the disclosure
without absorbing any of the costs associated with isolating DNA sequence."'
"Under an intellectual property regime that allows gene fragment patenting,
researchers and their investors reap the monetary rewards of genetic research, and
... the public gains the benefits of the newly acquired scientific knowledge ... ,"112
Fairness principles would dictate such a result.113 If only trade secret protections
were used, the public would not gain the benefit of newly acquired scientific
knowledge. Thus far, equally good policy, legal, and ethical arguments exist on both
sides of the debate. The task is trying to find a compromise that protects knowledge
in the public domain and encourages further biotech research.

III. PTO AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES
This section addresses some of the ways the PTO and Congress have tried to
strike a balance between the opposing views concerning the patenting of genes and
gene fragments. Part A summarizes the PTO's response while Part B summarizes
Congress's limited reactions.

A. PTO Reeharaeterizes Utility Standard
The PTO, overseeing the registration and maintenance of patents, must apply
the statutory requirements for patentability and pertinent case law when examining
patent applications. 114 To ensure that examiners follow the patentability standards,
the PTO established the Utility Examination Guidelines in 1995 ("1995 Guidelines"),
specifically targeting biotechnology patent applications. 11 5 The liberal standard
outlined in the 1995 Guidelines promulgated a two-pronged test for establishing
utility. 116 The asserted utility required credibility and specificity. 117 Credibility was
established if the existence of utility would be convincing to one of ordinary skill in
the art in light of documentary evidence provided in the record. 118 The specificity
requirement only needed an unambiguous communication of a particular purpose for

Therefore, in an effort to prevent the "free-rider" situation, the intentional delay in public disclosure
of inventions would lead to duplicative efforts in the same area of research. Id.
III

Id.

Id. at 265.
See Lacy, supra note 104, at 802. "It seems fundamentally unfair to require researchers
and investors to expend enormous resources, publicize results, and provide benefit to the public
without the guarantee of potential return on the investment." Id.
114 See goenerally Timothy A. Worrall, The 2001 PTO UtilityExamination Guidelines and DNA
Patents, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 123, 131 (2001) (describing the role of the PTO in patent law
administration).
11H5
See 1995 Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263, 36,264 (July 14, 1995).
116 J. Timothy Meigs, Biotechnology Patent Prosecutionin View of PTO5 UtilityExamination
Guidelines, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 451, 458-59 (2001).
117 I-d. at 459.
118 In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1326 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
112
113
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the invention. 119 Furthermore, under the 1995 Guidelines, the burden was on the
examiner to make a prima facie showing of no-utility in order to rebut the
presumption of utility. 120 This approach deviated from the "substantial" utility
1 21
standard adopted by the Unites States Supreme Court in Brenner.
The 1995 Guidelines spawned a great deal of criticism from the public and
provoked a flood of applications claiming credible utility for DNA sequences,
particularly ESTs.1 22 In response to these criticisms, the PTO issued a higher
standard in the 1999 Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines ("1999
Guidelines").123 These guidelines, returning to the Brenner standard, revised the
1995 Guidelines and provided two tests for establishing utility: the "well-established"
utility test and the "specific, substantial, and credible" utility test.1 24 These
alternative tests were affirmed in the latest version of the Utility Examination
Guidelines published in 2001 ("2001 Guidelines").125
Under both the 1999 and 2001 Guidelines, satisfaction of the specificity
requirement occurred when the asserted utility was "particular to the subject matter
claimed." 126 The Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials ("Training
Materials") that accompanied the 1999 Guidelines expressly noted that patent
applications for DNA sequences, claiming utility as a gene probe or marker to recover
larger gene fragments, would not suffice to satisfy the utility requirement without
also identifying the particular gene target; such a claim lacked specificity. 127 In order
to satisfy the "substantial utility" requirement, the 1999 and 2001 Guidelines
demanded that a claim have a "real world use." 128 Although the PTO did not
conclusively deny the patentability of gene fragments, the PTO made the prospect of
overcoming the utility hurdle significantly more difficult.
The 2001 Guidelines and the heightened utility standard are not the best ways
11) So 1995 Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. at 36,264. "Ifthe applicant has asserted that the claimed
invention is useful for any particular purpose (i.e., a 'specific utility') and that assertion would be
considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art, [the examiner will] not impose a rejection
based on lack of utility." Id.
120 In re Brana 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (recognizing that the law presumes the
correct assertion of utility in patent disclosure and that it is the burden of the PTO to challenge this
presumption); see aso Jn re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 224 (.C.P.A. 1971). [I]t is incumbent upon
the Patent Office ...to explain why it doubts the truth or accuracy of any statement in a supporting
disclosure and to back up assertions of its own with acceptable evidence or reasoning which is
inconsistent with the contested statement." Id.
121 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
122 Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 103, at 325. "[T]he PTO was awash in applications for
patents on DNA sequences by NIH and commercial companies [and]... . [b]y October of 1996, the
PTO faced 350 pending gene patent applications that collectively claimed more than 500,000
sequences." Id.
123 1999 Interim Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,440, 71,440 (Dec. 21, 1999).
12 Id.
125 2001 Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092, 1,098 (Jan. 5, 2001).
126

i1 ih.r
Biotechnology: The Fate of Gene Patents Under the Now Utility Guidelines, 2001

DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, 12 (2001) [hereinafter iBrieA.
127 Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 103, at 327; see also U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF.,
REVISED INTERIM UTILITY GUIDELINES TRAINING MATERIALS 5 (1999),
available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/utility.pdf [hereinafter TRAINING MATERIALS].
128 Soo Esoy, supra note 48, at 153 (highlighting the "real world" benefit requirement,
consistent with the Supreme Court's position in Brenner); see also TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note
127, at 6 (characterizing substantial utility as one "that defines a 'real world' use").
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to ensure the reasonable accessibility of research materials while guaranteeing that
researchers will make reasonable returns for their efforts. As mentioned previously,
without patent protection, researchers would be forced to resort to other forms of
protection, such as trade secrets, 129 and avoid disclosure all together. One of the
purposes of patent law is to ensure disclosure of inventions takes place, a purpose
130
that trade secret law does not serve well.
The heightened utility standard in the 2001 Guidelines effectively prohibits the
patenting of DNA sequences, even as research tools, because in order to satisfy the
utility requirement, the claimed DNA sequence must correspond to a known gene.
The ability to prove correspondence is often a difficult task to complete and would
presumably require a lengthy amount of time. 13 1 However, failure to file a patent
application in the United States within one year of publication of any description of
the invention or before any use of the invention takes place will result in a loss of
right to patent. 13 2 A potential patent applicant must choose between disclosing his
invention and losing the right to patent that invention forever. Such a scenario
favors nondisclosure. Without disclosure, others are not able to make advancements
that expand on the technology the invention offers. Therefore, the PTO "is not
upholding its Constitutional responsibility of promoting the progress" of useful arts,
133
and Congress must address this issue.

B. CongressIntroducesBills
In 2002, two bills that, if enacted, would challenge the patenting of isolated gene
fragments were introduced in the House of Representatives.1 3 4 The first bill, called
the Genomic Science and Technology Innovation Act of 2002, requires the Director of
the Office of Science and Technology Policy to conduct a study assessing "the impact
of Federal policies, including intellectual property policies, on the innovation process
for genomic technologies." 135 In particular, the bill seeks to study the effects of
alternative intellectual property systems compared to the current system,
129

See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. Trade secret protection may last
indefinitely as long as there is neither disclosure of the secret information nor third party
development through reverse engineering. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, PriorRestraints and
Intellectual Property: The Clash Between Intellectual Propertyand the FirstAmendment from an
Economic Perspective, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 61-62 (2001).
131 iBrief supranote 126,
32.
132 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless.., the invention was known or used
by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
...the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.
Id. at (a)-(b).
133 Franz and Faletra, supra note 11, at 25.
134 Rochelle K. Seide with Michelle LeCointe, Two New Bills Present Challenges to DNA
Patentability
GENOMEWEB
DAILY
NEWS
2,
May
24,
2002,
http://www.genomeweb.com/articles/view-article.asp?Article=200252412129.
135 Genomic Science and Technology Innovation Act of 2002, H.R. 3966, 107th Cong. (2002).
130
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considering factors such as costs, availability of funding, access to genomic materials,
and rate and quality of innovation. 136 This bill purports to evaluate ways to
"minimize some of the negative impacts of patents on the practice of medicine and
the advancement of science" rather than directly challenge the validity of DNA
13 7
sequence patents.
The second bill, called the Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of
2002, seeks to amend title 35 to limit the scope of patent protection of genes and gene
fragments. 138 The amendment would "provide for non-infringing uses of patents on
genetic sequence information for purposes of research and genetic diagnostic testing,
and ... require public disclosure" of all sequence information filed in a patent
application within thirty days of such filing. 13 9 Compared to the current system, this
proposal severely limits a patent applicant's right to secrecy by compelling
publication of the patent application approximately seventeen months earlier than
140
normally would be required.
How this second bill will encourage innovation in the field of genetics remains
unclear. The exemption for infringement is constrained to strictly research uses and
will not extend to entities or individuals who wish to use the patented sequence for
commercial purposes.141 However, much of genetic research is performed with the
anticipation of commercial exploitation of the knowledge gained from such
research. 142
Therefore, this provision may have little or no effect on the
encouragement of innovation, and may fail to address the concerns regarding
136 See Seide with LeCointe, supra note 134,
3-4; see also H.R. 3966 (noting that the
purpose behind the legislation was to supplement Congress's limited knowledge of the impact of
intellectual property rights on genomic technologies).
137 Ted Agres, Reexamining Genetic Patents,DRUG DISCOVERY AND DEV., June 1, 2002, at 15
(quoting 148 CONG. REC. E353, E354 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (statement of Rep. Rivers)). But see
Seide with LeCointe, supra note 134, 8. Seide draws attention to potential problems with this bill.
Id. She argues that exploration into such factors as "the costs of downstream products, and choice of
research area" in conjunction with "the lack of study standards and protocols in the bill could readily
lead to a biased assessment against gene patents." id. Biased results could emerge because factors
such as availability of funding and reduction in availability of materials are present in other fields of
technology, yet inventions within those fields are not subject to the same kind of analysis. See
gonerally id. Seide recommends "an objective, non-biased study" to consider whether the present
patent system leads to more chilling of advances in genetics than it does in other fields. Id.
10.
Yet, despite these reservations, this bill appears to be the only step that Congress has taken towards
understanding the relationship between patent protection and genetic research.
138 Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th Cong. (2002).
139

Id.

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 122, 202, 205 (2000) (providing that a patent application will be published
eighteen months after the earliest filing date and granting general rights of confidentiality to a
patent applicant).
140

141

H.R. 3967.

See Seide with LeCointe, supra note 134,
13. "A great deal of genomics research is
undertaken, even in academia, with the idea of eventual commercialization." Id. Even those who
engage in technological development through the use of federal funds are able to gain title and
exploit their research for profit. See Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing,
Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in BiotechnologyInnovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 141, 158-59 (2004). This entitlement was granted by the Government Patent Policy Act of
1980, also known as the Bayh-Dole Act, which went into effect in 1981. Id. at 159. The intended
effect of this legislation was to promote collaborative efforts between the private and public sector in
biotechnology and to promote the use of inventions that arose from federally funded research. Id. at
155; see also 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000).
112
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patenting DNA sequences under the current patent system. 143
Currently, neither bill has been enacted, nor has any apparent action taken
place with respect to the bills since their introduction in 2002.144 The courts are left
with the burden of balancing the public and private interests supporting and
opposing DNA sequence patenting without any direction from Congress on how to
best resolve this matter.

IV.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

This section examines how the courts have struggled to define what the 2001
Guidelines' utility standard requires with respect to DNA sequence patent
applications. The case of In re Fisher involved a patent application for ESTs
generated from maize pooled leaf tissue. 145 The utility claims asserted in that
application included: serving as molecular markers for mapping the entire maize
genome; identifying polymorphisms; 146 restricting protein expression; and locating
genetic molecules of other plants and organisms.1 47 The examiner, in rejecting the
asserted claims, determined that the uses declared were non-specific because they
1 48
applied generally to nucleic acids; thus, the utility requirement was not satisfied.
The examiner also noted that "there was no known use for the proteins produced as
final products resulting from processes involving the claimed ESTs,"149 and that
"determining whether the claimed [ESTs] have ...polymorphisms would require
'determining whether there was a polymorphism within such a sequence and then
determining how to use this information in a patentably meaningful way."' 150 Thus,
the examiner concluded that because identifying a real-world use required further
151
research, the substantial utility requirement was also not fulfilled.
Fisher appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI")
where the court upheld the examiner's final rejection. 152 On further appeal, before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the case was reviewed using a
"substantial evidence" standard. 153
The court, in reaffirming the examiner's
143 So Seide with LeCointe, supra note 134,
13; see also supra notes 129-133 and
accompanying text (describing the concerns with current patent system and the heightened utility
requirement as they apply to DNA sequences).
144 See Genomic Science and Technology Innovation Act of 2002, H.R. 3966, 107th Cong.
(2002); H.R. 3967.
145 In -reFisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
146 Polymorphism is a term used to describe a situation where two or more distinct variant
forms exist. See GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 18, at 11. In the context of molecular genetics,
polymorphism refers to the difference in DNA sequences among individuals. Id.
147

In

re Fisher,

421 F.3d at 1368.

118Id. (particularly asserting "that any EST may serve as a molecular tag to isolate genetic
regions").
149 Id,

150 Ex parte Fisher, App. No. 2002-2046, at *3 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 31, 2004), available at
http://lorac.typepad.com/patent blog/files/fisher est-sequences.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
151 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1368.
152 Exparte Fisher, App. No. 2002-2046, at *2.
153 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1369; see also In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(concluding that when "review of [BPArs] decision is confined to the factual record compiled by the
Board, ... the 'substantial evidence' standard is appropriate for ... review of Board factfindings").
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rejection, adopted the real-world test for determining substantial utility as
5
articulated by the PTO.1
4 Further, the court stated that, for an invention to qualify
as specific, "an application must disclose a use which is not so vague as to be
meaningless." 155 Therefore, a claimed utility must provide a particular, well-defined
156
benefit to society.
In determining whether Fisher's asserted uses satisfied this standard, the court
turned to the examples set forth in the Training Materials and the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure ("MPEP").157 Analogizing the Fishercase to the example in the
MPEP relating to cDNA fragments, the court held that "a claim directed to a
polynucleotide disclosed to be useful as a 'gene probe' or 'chromosome marker,' as is
the case here, fails to satisfy the specific utility requirement unless a specific DNA
1
target is also disclosed." 58
The majority's inflexible opinion in Fisherfails to address the research value
that ESTs and other DNA sequences have within the biotech community. In his
dissenting opinion, Judge Rader defended the utility of the claimed ESTs as research

"Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."' In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Consol.
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
151In re Fis-her,421 F.3d at 1371.
155 Id., see In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 941 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (stating that phrases such as
"biological properties" or "biological activities" are nebulous expressions that do not convey
usefulness of the compounds nor give any indication of how to use them).
1,56In re Fis-her,421 F.3d at 1371.
The courts interpret the statutory term "useful" to require disclosure of at least
one available practical benefit to the public. The Guidelines reflect this
determination by requiring the disclosure of at least one specific, substantial, and
credible utility. If no such utility is disclosed or readily apparent from an
application, the Office should reject the claim.
2001 Guidelines, Comment 9, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092, 1,094 (Jan. 5, 2001).
157 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372; see TRAINING MATERIALS, supra note 127, at 51-53; see also
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE
§
2107.01
(8th
ed.
2001),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pae/mpep/mpep-e8r3-2100.pdf [hereinafter MPEP].
158In re Fisher,421 F.3d at 1373. The 2001 Guidelines appear to contradict the PTO's position
regarding the utility of DNA sequences as markers in responding to the comments received as
requested in the 1999 Interim Guidelines:
Several comments stated that DNA should be considered unpatentable because a
DNA sequence by itself has little utility. Response. A DNA sequence-i.e., the
sequence of base pairs making up a DNA molecule-is simply one of the
properties of a DNA molecule. Like any descriptive property, a DNA sequence
itself is not patentable. A purified DNA molecule isolated from its natural
environment, on the other hand, is a chemical compound and is patentable if all
the statutory requirements are met. An isolated and purified DNA molecule may
meet the statutory utility requirement if, e.g., it can be used to produce a useful
protein or it hybridizes near and serves as a marker for a disease gene. Therefore,
a DNA molecule is not per se unpatentable for lack of utility, and each application
claim must be examined on its own facts.
2001 Guidelines, Comment 8, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092, 1,094 (Jan. 5, 2001). The court also acknowledged
that it would have considered, as proof of practical utility, evidence that the invention reached
commercial success, but because Fisher failed to offer any such evidence, commercial success did not
support the utility of the ESTs. In re Fisher,421 F.3d at 1378. The court did not address any public
policy consideration for or against the patenting of ESTs in its opinion. See id.
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tools in studying and isolating other molecules. 159 As research tools, Rader stated,
"[ESTs] have a 'specific' and 'substantial' utility sufficient for § 101."160 Rader
analogized the claimed ESTs to a microscope because both are useful tools that lead
scientists to a greater understanding of the corn genome. 161 Furthermore, the
dissenting opinion criticizes the majority's use of value judgments in concluding that
the functions the ESTs admittedly provided were not valuable. 162 Judge Rader
concluded that the majority erred in holding that "a research tool has a 'specific' and
'substantial' utility only if the studied object is readily understandable using the
163
claimed tool-that no further research is required."
While the court's decision in Fisher seems to be another obstacle in the road
leading to DNA sequence patents, there remains much confusion as to how the utility
scheme applies to DNA sequences. This confusion is apparent in the different
interpretations by the Fisbher majority and dissenting opinions of the same utility
guidelines provided by the PTO. Unfortunately, Congress has done very little to
address this issue. Nevertheless, Congress is in the best position to implement an
appropriate solution to protect the interests of researchers, promote further
innovation in biotechnology, and address any concerns offered by opponents of DNA
sequence patenting.
However, until Congress can implement any effective
resolution, the decision in Fisbhermust be reversed.

V. PROPOSAL

Given
sequences,
patentable
that DNA

the many arguments in favor of granting patent rights for DNA
it seems unlikely that excluding DNA sequences from the definition of
subject matter offers the best means of alleviating the negative impact
sequence patents may have on future innovation. As discussed in Part

159 In re Fisher,421 F.3d at 1379 (Rader, J., dissenting).
160

Id. Judge Rader acknowledged, however, that the utility would be limited to a research

setting. Id.

at 1380. Judge Rader asserted that:
[t]hese research tools are similar to a microscope; both take a researcher one step
closer to identifying and understanding a previously unknown and invisible
structure. Both supply information about a molecular structure. Both advance
research and bring scientists closer to unlocking the secrets of the corn genome to
provide better food production for the hungry world. If a microscope has § 101
utility, so too do these ESTs.

161 So id.

Id.
162 Id.
163

Id. The majority adopts the PTO's position in the MPEP as to the patentability of research

tools:
An assessment that focuses on whether an invention is useful only in a research
setting thus does not address whether the invention is in fact "useful" in a patent
sense. Instead, [the PTO] must distinguish between inventions that have a
specifically identified substantial utility and inventions whose asserted utility
requires further research to identify or reasonably confirm. Labels such as
'research tool," "intermediate" or "for research purposes" are not helpful in
determining if an applicant has identified a specific and substantial utility for the
invention.
MPEP, supranote 157, at § 2107.01.
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III.A above, the PTO has imposed increasingly more stringent conditions for meeting
the patentability requirement.
This, along with the narrow interpretation in
Fisher,164 has effectively denied patent rights for DNA sequences, failed to identify
the value in granting such rights, and disregarded the public and private interests in
reaching a compromise in this matter. This proposal offers a two-step suggestion for
correcting this predicament.
The first step requires that the United States Supreme Court reverse the
decision in Fisher or otherwise limit that decision. The Fisher majority incorrectly
applied the Brenner standard and failed to properly analyze the utility claims as
specified under the MPEP. 165 If left unchallenged, the decision will leave a precedent
that will severely limit, if not completely prevent, the patenting of some DNA
sequences, particularly ESTs. Congress must balance the apprehensions concerning
DNA sequence patenting with the benefits that patent protection offers to the biotech
community. Until Congress can find a more appropriate solution to this dilemma,
the Supreme Court must establish guidelines for examining DNA sequence utility
claims such that the exclusive right to a patent DNA sequences remains a viable
option.
The second step requires congressional involvement.
Congress, the only
governmental body with explicit authority to address this issue, must take action and
find a resolution which will promote research and discovery while allowing
reasonable access to the products of such research. The subsequent sections discuss
three potential resolutions that Congress can adopt. Part A discusses prospective
licensing schemes. Part B discusses enforcing an experimental use exception. Part C
discusses ways in which the scope of patent rights as they apply to gene fragments
may be limited. Out of these three resolutions, a licensing regime that incorporates
patent pooling 166 is the most promising.

A. LieensingRegulations
One of the principal arguments against DNA sequence patenting is that the
practice would take the use of information away from researchers. This argument
declares that once an inventor obtains the exclusive rights to a DNA sequence, the
inventor is left with little incentive to license the sequence at a reasonable price or to

164

Seo In ro Eisher,421 F.3d at 1373.

165

The MPEP particularly explains that a claim for a DNA sequence patent must specify a

particular DNA target but does not require disclosure of the particular function of the DNA target.
Soo MPEP, supra note 157, § 2107.01. Moreover, the Brenner court rationale, on which the Fis-her
court relied on, does not apply to DNA sequence patents whose asserted utilities have little to do
with the underlying function of the specific DNA function. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519,
535 (1966); see also supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. While Brenner held that a chemical
process that produced products of unknown function were unpatentable, in Fiher,the ESTs were
not a process or method but products themselves. In re Fiber,421 F.3d at 1369. The asserted
utility for those ESTs were to serve as research tools as probes and markers for specific DNA targets
and not as methods or intermediates for producing those targets. Id. 1368. These uses as research
tools are "real world" uses. "Unlike the methods ... in Brenner ....
Fisher's claimed EST's aro
beneficial to society." Id. at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting).
106 See infra note 175 for further discussion of patent pooling.
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license it at all. 167 One solution is for Congress to issue licensing regulations specific
168
to DNA sequence patents.
Under a compulsory licensing scheme, all DNA sequence patent holders would
be required to license their inventions to commercial researchers either in return for
set uniform licensing rates 169 or for royalty payments that would vary depending on
the financial success of the products developed from such licenses.170 Uniform
licensing rates make less sense in the context of DNA sequence patents because
different sequences have different values, depending on where the sequences are
located in the genetic code. A patent for a large portion of a tumor suppressor
gene, 171 for example, would be much more valuable than a patent for a non-coding,
non-regulatory DNA sequence. It would not be appropriate to charge the same fee to
172
license either of these two patents.
Under the variable royalty payment licensing regime, commentators have
proposed that collective rights organizations ("CROs"),173 privately organized
institutions, "would negotiate licenses for the use of proprietary technologies in
commercial research" and set varying exchange rules based on what rights are being
transferred. 174

Patent pools

175

are a type of CRO that collect licensing rights and

167 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
168 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules." Intellectual Property Rights and

Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1996).
169 Such a scheme would be governed by statute and would reduce the transaction costs
associated with drafting, negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing licenses. Id. Contracting among
owners and users of a patented invention for the purpose of exchanging rights involves high
transaction costs. Id. at 1302. However, uniform terms and costs would greatly reduce the need for
lengthy negotiations and dramatically lower the costs of exchanging rights. Id. at 1302-03.
170 David C. Hoffman, Note, A Modest Proposal. Toward Improved Access to Biotechnology
Research Tools by Implementing a Broad Experimental Use Exception, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 993,
1032 (2004).
171 Inactivation of a tumor suppressor gene leads to tumor development. COOPER, supra note
23, at 669.
172 Under an economic system that relies primarily on market forces to allocate goods and to
determine prices for those goods, it would follow that, since demand would dictate the cost, licensing
fees for the more valuable, coveted tumor-]suppressor gene sequence would expectedly be higher
than that of a non-coding sequence, for example. See generally Answers.com, Market Economy,
http://www.answers.com/topic/market-economy (last visited Jan. 17, 2006) (describing a market
economy and the relationship between supply and demand).
173 Collective rights organizations are "knowledgeable industry participants [that] set the rules
of exchange." Merges, supra note 168, at 1295. Through expert tailoring, these CROs set the
royalty rates. Id. at 1296. This scheme is not statutory and has therefore "proven to be more
flexible over time;" it avoids a "legislative lock-in," and is less susceptible to congressional lobbying.
Id. at 1299.
174 Hoffman, supranote 170, at 1039.
175 See Jeanne Clark et al., PatentPools:A Solution to the Problem ofAccess in Biotechnology
Patents?, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Office of Patent Legal Administration at 4
(Dec. 5, 2000), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf.
The PTO defines a
patent pool as:
an agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or more of their
patents to one another or third parties. Alternatively, a patent pool may also be
defined as "the aggregation of intellectual property rights which are the subject of
cross-licensing, whether they are transferred directly by patentee to licensee or
through some medium, such as a joint venture, set up specifically to administer
the patent pool."
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price them for sale to the public to more efficiently transfer these rights. 176 The rules
of exchange are "established by the members of the organization, and thus, are the
177
products of internal negotiations by knowledgeable people in the industry."
Patent pools offer the best solution for ensuring reasonable access to DNA
sequences for research.
First, the "gatekeeper" or "blocking" patent problem
commonly associated with DNA sequence patents would be diminished. 178 A single
entity can provide licenses necessary for practicing biotechnology. 179 Furthermore,
this situation could potentially lead to a greater rate of advancement because pool
members would have equal access to research tools. Also, as previously discussed,
CROs lower transaction costs often associated with obtaining licenses on patented
resources.180 Moreover, Congress has the authority to authorize mandatory pooling
181
of DNA sequence patents.

B. Experimental Use Exception
Many commentators have advocated establishing a broad experimental use
defense or exception to patent infringement.1 8 2 This proposition derives from the fair
use exception recognized under American copyright law. 18 3
Indeed, there are
Id. at 4 (quoting Joel I. Klein, Address to the American Intellectual Property Law Association: On
the Subject of Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law (May 2, 1997)).
176 See Mireles, supra note 142, at 141.
177 Merges, supra note 168, at 1300.
178 The gatekeeper problem occurs when overlapping patent claims prevent any use of one
patent without infringing another. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
179 Clark et al., supra note 175, at 8.
180 See supra note 173.
1S See Clark et al., supra note 175, at 5-6. However, problems with antitrust laws, such as
the Sherman Act, designed to prevent the creation of monopolies and restraints on interstate
commerce, may arise in a patent pool establishment if the pool is anticompetitive. Id. Such
'[a]nticompetitive effects may ...
occur if the pooling arrangement deters or discourages
participants from engaging in research and development." Id. at 7. There are guidelines that
pooling agreements should follow to avoid antitrust scrutiny: a proposed licensing program should
be likely to integrate complementary patent rights, and "the resulting competitive benefits are likely
to be outweighed by the competitive harm posed by other aspects of the program." Id. As long as
these guidelines are followed, the risk of inflating the costs of reasonably priced goods or the risk of
price-fixing will diminish.
182 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science.* Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1078 (1989) (recommending "an experimental use
exemption from patent infringement liability" to verify the accuracy of a specification or the validity
of patent claims, but not for "research use of a patented invention with a primary.., market among
research users," and suggesting that when exempt experimental use leads to significant
improvement in the patented technology, the patent holder "might be ... award[ed] a reasonable
royalty").
183 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
Under this provision, non-copyright owners are, in effect,
granted a privilege to use copyrighted material without having to pay royalties or licensing fees if
that use is a fair use. Id. Factors to consider when determining whether a use is a fair use are: "the
purpose and character of the use ... ;the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." Id. Market failure,
including "(i) high transaction costs that frustrate private bargaining; (ii) positive externalities that
prevent the infringer from being able to pay the copyright owner's price for a license; and (iii) the

[5:238 2006]

Patentability of DNA Sequences

situations in which "the public benefit from the infringement may be so great that it
outweighs the patentee's interest in its exclusive rights. '' 8 4 The law recognizes the
judicially-created patent experimental use exception in limited situations.1 8 5 This
exception requires a "traditional basic research" use, with no commercial
18 6
implications, for the purpose of testing the adequacy of the specification.
Commentators assert that the definition of experimental use for the purposes of
the exception should be broadened to reflect a balancing between the private benefits
of granting exclusive use and the public interests in nonexclusive use.187 Courts,
thus far, have been reluctant to expand the experimental use exception to reflect
copyright fair use. 188 In the case of Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., Judge
Rader wrote in his concurring opinion that Patent Law leaves "no room for any de
minimis or experimental use excuses ... because intent is irrelevant to patent

infringement."' 18 9 Rader argues that the issue of the extent of infringement should be
discussed only as it pertains to damages. 190
Furthermore, if the doctrine of
experimental use retains validity, Rader argues that "the slightest commercial
191
implications will render the .. .doctrine inapplicable."

Notwithstanding the benefits that broadening the experimental use exception
would have in theory, problems could arise from such an expansion. One potential
failure of any market for the particular use to develop," has justified the fair use privilege.
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine ofFair Use in PatentLaw, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1188
(2000). Commentators of market failure justification have warned that the privilege should be
limited to instances when the copyright holder has an "antidissemination motive" rather than a
desire related to the goals of the copyright. See id.at 1189.
184 O'Rourke, supranote 183, at 1198. Thus far, the Patent Act allows for certain exceptions to
patent infringement. The first exception, stating that "[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to
make, use, or ... sell a patented invention ...solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission or information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs ... ," allows for otherwise infringing activities necessary to obtain Federal Drug
Administration approval. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). The other exception, limits the remedies
that a patent holder is entitled to for infringing medical activity performed by a medical practitioner
or related entity. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2000).
185 See Poppenhusen v. N.Y. Gutta Percha Comb Co., 19 F. Cas. 1059, 1063 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1858) (No. 11,283) (noting that use of a patented invention "merely for experiment, and not with a
view to profit" does not give rise to patent infringement liability). An example of a situation in
which the experimental use exception would exist is "for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency
of the [invention] to produce its described effects." Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121
(C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). Thus, "[t]he experimental use doctrine thus gives the patentee's
competitors a right during the patent term to vindicate the public's interest in having an enabling
disclosure." Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Prop-rietaryRights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 222 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Norms ofScience]. Another example
is when the subsequent user is trying to fashion alternatives to the patented invention with no
commercial motive. Id. at 224.
18 Eisenberg, Norms ofScience, supra note 185, at 224.
187 Eisenberg, Norms ofScience, supra note 185, at 224.
188 See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (refusing to
"construe the experimental use rule so broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise
of 'scientific inquiry,' when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial
purposes").
189 Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J.,
concurring).
190 See id. at 1353.
191 Id.
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problem is in the standard's application. Once research has any commercial value, a
court would have difficulty in deciding how much commercial value is too much and
how much public interest in the infringing use is too little when determining whether
the exception should take effect. The difficulty is not in the justification of the
exception but in setting the limits of where permissible experimental use ends and
where impermissible infringing use begins. 192 Therefore, patent pooling is a more
practical solution to the DNA sequence patent problem than broadening of the
experimental use exception.

C Limiting the Scope ofRights for DNA Sequence Patents
Rather than working around the current patent system, many individuals
advocate the system's expansion via the adoption of nonexclusive patents. 193 Under
the normal patent scheme, the first to invent and satisfy the statutory requirements
can obtain exclusive property rights to that invention; under a nonexclusive scheme,
the inventor will only be protected "against free-riding competitors, but not against
194
competitors who independently develop the same technology."
Proponents of this system acknowledge that nonexclusive protection would cause
inventors to slow development efforts to avoid expending excessive costs for the
purpose of securing the temporary monopoly that patent law confers. 195 However,
the argument is that this decision would more accurately reflect a competitive
marketplace where inventors are forced to balance the risks and benefits of
commencing a prospective project. 196 Others in favor of nonexclusive patenting
contend that, unlike situations where there is a short supply of substitutes and the
threat of monopoly is high, "the possibility of anticompetitive behavior in the

192

See Eisenberg, supra note 182, at 224.
Too narrow a defense could stifle basic research and impair the community's

mechanisms for validating and building upon new knowledge. Too broad a
defense could cause industrial sponsors to lose interest in biotechnology research
or to rely on secrecy in lieu of patent protection.

There may be no way to avoid

both of these potential problems completely.
Id.
193

See John S. Leibovitz, Note, Inventing a Nonexclusive PatentSystem, 111 YALE L.J. 2251,

2268 (2002).
19

Id.

195 Id.at 2269.

If consumers value an invention so much that they are willing to pay higher
prices-enough to offset expedited development-then the inventor should speed
up his efforts in order to get to market sooner. If there is an acute risk that an

invention is not especially valuable to society, the inventor might slow
development, reduce costs, and allocate resources to other projects in his research
portfolio in order to achieve an optimal risk-reward balance. A nonexclusive
patent system allows the development pace to be optimized by a rational economic
actor . . . , without the racing incentives presented by the prospect of gaining or
losing a monopoly on a technological improvement.

Id.
196 Id.
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commercialization of technologies" would be minimized. 197
How such a system would be implemented remains unclear. One commentator
advocates a system of partial disclosure, falling somewhere in between the full
disclosure that exclusive patents requires and the nondisclosure that characterizes
trade secrets. 198 In such a system, only a functional overview and not a complete
technical specification would be published. 199 Although the PTO would require a
technical specification, with a full written description, drawings, and novel claims,
this specification would remain on file with the PTO rather than made available to
the public. 20 0 This would enable prospective inventors to search the PTO database to
20 1
determine whether a particular tool and potential licensing opportunity exists.

The difficulty with this approach is that it would require "a radical
reformulation of our current system of intellectual property protection." 20 2 No
recognized practice of granting nonexclusive patents exists under the current system
of patent law. Article I, § 8, cl. 8 of the United States Constitution expressly confers
to Congress the power to grant inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries. 20 3 A
narrow interpretation of the Constitution would lead one to conclude that Congress
does not have the power to grant inventors any nonexelusive rights to their
discoveries.
Other suggestions for limiting the scope of patent protection as applied to DNA
sequence patents involve either narrowing the definition of what is protected under
patent law20 4 or shortening the length of patent protection. 20 5 Supposedly, such
197 Id. at 2270.
Leibovitz further asserts that "[t]he presence of competition in a nonexclusive
patent system ... provides great incentive for patent holders to license their inventions," without
the need for compulsory licensing, in order to avoid redundant projects. Id. at 2272. The idea is that
either way, the inventor of a particular technology will face competition, but it would make more
sense for that inventor to make money from his competitors through licensing than to withhold
licenses. See id. Likewise, it would be economically more favorable for competitors to license the
technology from the original inventor than to expend even more money developing a technology that
already exists. Id. This situation, Leibovitz maintains, works to avoid redundant development
efforts. Id.
198 Id. at 2277.
199 Td. at 2277-78. Leibovitz states that:
the functional overview would explain in very general terms what an invention
does without detailing how it works. It would contain basic facts about the
inventor and the invention, similar to the opening sections of the patent
specification required under the current rules (excluding the detailed description
and drawings). It would also contain a substantive overview of the purpose and
general function of the invention, similar to the "brief summary of invention"
section required under current rules.

Id.
200 Id.

Id.
Hoffman, supranote 170, at 1043.
203 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
204 Those that offer this proposition state that patent protection for DNA sequences would
cover only a specific use or function of that sequence.
AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND
GYNECOLOGISTS COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, PATENTS, MEDICINE, AND THE INTERESTS OF PATIENTS:
APPLYING GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO GENE PATENTING, COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 277 (Nov. 2002),
reprinted in ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 113 (2d ed. 2004), available
at http://www.acog.org/from home/publications/ethics/ethicslll.pdf. This concept is encompassed in
a use patent where, unlike composition-of-matter patents that:
201
202
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limitations would help to prevent a complete monopoly over any given DNA
sequence.
Significant barriers to limiting the extent of patent protection within a
particular field of technology exist. All of these rights-limiting suggestions would
require legislative amendments to the current patent system as it applies to
biotechnology, gene fragments in particular. However, there are restrictions as to
what Congress can legislate.
The 1994 Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
("TRIPs"), identifying standards for intellectual property protection, binds member
20 6
countries of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), including the United States.
Article 8 of the TRIPs Agreement provides that "[Miembers may, in formulating or
amending their national laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that
such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement." 20 7 However,
Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement states that "patents shall be available and patent
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to ... the field of technology." 208 The
meaning of "field of technology" remains unclear. 20 9 One could argue that restricting
the rights granted to DNA sequence patents would constitute discrimination as to a
field of technology-namely biotechnology. Thus, if legislation limiting the potential
patent rights of DNA sequences is enacted, a TRIPs Agreement violation argument
will certainly follow. 210 However, such barriers do not facilitate Congress's ability to

may be enforced broadly against a variety of uses of the claimed product, . . . [t]he
enforcement of a use patent is narrower, being limited to the patented use.
Although a use patent restricts the right to use a patented method using a
product of composition, it does not restrict access to the product or composition
itself.

Id.
205 See Laurie L. Hill, The Race to Patent the Genome: Free Riders, Hold Ups, and the Future
ofMedical Breakthroughs, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 221, 251-52 (2003). Commentators who are

in favor of a shorter patent term suggest that this would amplify the availability of newly discovered
DNA sequences because the sequences will be received into the public domain at an earlier time. d.
at 251. The current duration of patent protection is generally 20 years from the application filing
date with the PTO. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
206 CHISUM, supra note 60, § 1.01.
207 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Annex IC, Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81, art. 8,
1 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS].
208 Id. at art. 27,
1. Nevertheless,
[WTO m]embers may exclude from patentability inventions the prevention ... of
the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect [public order] or
morality, including to protect human ... life or health ... [,] diagnostic,
therapeutic ... methods for the treatment of humans or animals ... [J and
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than
non-biological and microbiological processes.

Id.

2-3.

Cynthia D. Lopez-Beverage, Should Congress Do Something About Upstream Clogging
Caused by the Deficient Utility ofExpressed Sequence Tags?, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 35, 71 (2005).
210 "The Council for TRIPS shall monitor the operation of this Agreement and, in particular,
Members' compliance with their obligations hereunder, and shall afford Members the opportunity of
201)
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implement a compulsory patent pooling system.

VI. CONCLUSION

We are living in a genomics age where DNA technology is changing the way
we understand the causes of cancer and other diseases, treatment options, and the
basics of heredity. More than a molecular composition of matter, DNA is information
that should be freely accessible to all. Even so, deciphering the DNA code into useful
information is a costly endeavor. Patent law offers researchers the ability to recover
costly research expenses, make profits with which to fund further research, and
attract investors to expand on this research. However, the advantages of the patent
system are not without a fair share of shortcomings. Congress is in the best position
to offer reconciliation between those that have need of patent protection on DNA
sequences and those that oppose the negative effects this patent protection
generates.
The most logical solution is to allow patents on DNA sequences without the
stringent evaluation that the PTO and courts have adopted. Instead, the PTO should
follow a utility standard that more correctly reflects the purpose of patent law, "to
promote the progress of useful arts."211 To compensate for the diminished use of
information arising from the temporary monopoly granted to patent holders,212
Congress should implement a compulsory licensing regime for DNA sequences that
incorporates patent pools. This system would allow inventors to recover the costs of
developing the DNA discoveries, while simultaneously allowing reasonable access to
those discoveries. The trouble with executing such a system is not in its justification,
but rather in its implementation. The only governmental body with the authority to
compel DNA sequence patent holders to enter into patent pools is Congress.
However, the only governmental body able to offer a prompt remedy to the rigid
guidelines set forth by the PTO and narrowly interpreted in Fisher is the United
States Supreme Court. In order to achieve long term goals in biotech research, both
congressional and judicial attention is imperative.

consulting on matters relating to the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights." TRIPS,
supra note 207, art. 68. TRIPS member nations must provide patent protection in accordance with
the agreement and are subject to review by the Council for TRIPS. See id. art. 64, 3.
211 See In -reFisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader, J., dissenting).
212 In reality, accessibility is not diminished per se because the information is disclosed rather
than kept secret. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.

